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International Review of Administrative Sciences
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Performance-related pay and work motivation: theoretical and empirical perspectives for the French civil service

Virginie Forest

Laboratoire d'Économie de la Firme et des Institutions (LEFI), Université Lumière Lyon 2, Institut des Sciences de l'Homme (ISH), Lyon, France

At a time when the civil services of most OECD countries have embarked on a process of modernization of their practices, we are questioning the relevance of introducing performance-related pay systems, particularly in view of the, more often than not, negative effects on the work motivation of civil servants. The French civil service has recently decided to pay a part of its public officials on the basis of their performance, and we show how these individualized remuneration practices can, in the long term, undermine the public service motivations that drive some civil servants. Our reasoning is supported by the empirical results of studies conducted in the United States, in England and also in France, as well as on the developments of intrinsic motivation theories, combined with the developments of the public service motivation theory.

Points for the practitioners

Whereas the implementation of performance-related pay as an instrument of motivation has become widespread within the civil service, this article focuses on the difficulties inherent to these compensation practices. We underline in particular the negative effects of performance-related pay on the public service motivations of civil servants. As these specific motivations can be pushed aside, human resource management tools should be adopted that encourage the development of intrinsic motivation, such as task enlargement or enrichment or the implementation of participative management methods.

Key Words: civil service • intrinsic motivation • performance • performance-related pay • public service motivations

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 74, No. 2, 325-339 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0020852308089907


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