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International Review of Administrative Sciences
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The weakness of university legislative bodies: the cases of France and Italy

Stefano Boffo

University of Sassari, Italy

Pierre Dubois

University of Marne-la-Vallée, Italy

In theory, the Conseil d’administration in France and the Senato Accademico and the Consiglio di Amministrazione in Italy constitute the most powerful organs of government within the universities but their actual power can be limited. In fact, they are subject to a number of structural weaknesses. The first arises from their heterogeneous composition. The second is due to the fact that they are compelled to take into account decisions taken by faculty councils. The third relates to the spread of a presidential model of governance in the majority of universities in both countries. Without legislative reform, the Président — Rettore, who embodies the executive function — has a wide range of means enabling him/her to dominate the legislature. Should such a regime be institutionalized? Should additional roles be given to the existing legislative bodies, those of supervisor and evaluator, supported by the power to sanction using a form of ‘censure motion’?

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 71, No. 1, 35-54 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/0020852305051682


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